Chapter 11’s Silver Bullet and the Search for Liquidity by Goodelman, Jonathan
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2016
Chapter 11’s Silver Bullet and the Search for
Liquidity
Jonathan Goodelman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Goodelman, Jonathan, "Chapter 11’s Silver Bullet and the Search for Liquidity" (2016). Law School Student Scholarship. 762.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/762
 1 
 
 Chapter 11’s Silver Bullet and the Search for Liquidity  
 
Jonathan Goodelman

 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The failure of Lehman Brothers sent the global financial sector into complete 
disarray, which hastened the biggest global economic meltdown the modern world has 
ever seen.  In order to prevent further catastrophe, the United States, through the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), spent $700 billion in taxpayer money to bail out banks 
after the financial crisis.1  Congress responded to this highly controversial bailout and the 
demand for legislation by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”).2  This legislation is put forth in 
order to address the idea that these institutions are “too-big-to-fail.”3   
According to the Dodd-Frank Act’s title page, the statute’s purpose is "[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial service practices, 
and for other purposes."4  Particularly, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the 
                                                 
 J.D. Candidate, 2016 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011 Stony Brook University.  Special 
thanks to Professor Stephen J. Lubben for his guidance throughout the writing of this Comment. 
1 Bob Ivory talk, The True Cost of the Bank Bailout, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/economy/the-true-cost-of-the-bank-bailout/3309/.  
2 See generally Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer: What You 
Need to Know Now, vol. XXXI, No. 7, AM. BANKR. INST . L.J. 34 (2012); see also Bruce Grohsgal, Case in 
Brief Against,“Chapter 14,” vol. XXXIIIAM. BANKR. INST . L.J. 44 (2014).  
3 Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case against the Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills: Contingency Planning 
Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 32 (2012) (defining “too-big-to-fail” as the 
“problem caused when certain multinational financial institutions are so large that their insolvency could 
shake the entire financial system and the economy”); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: 
Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry before It Unravels , 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1698, 1726–27 (2006) (explaining that the term “too-big-to-fail” has received a lot of attention in the last two 
decades).  
4 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).  
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Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”).5  The OLA is established to liquidate failing 
financial firms and simultaneously prevent the liquidation from disrupting the market 
place.6  Supporters of the OLA claim that taxpayer bailouts are a thing of the past because 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has now been given the power to 
place a failing financial firm within their receivership.7  Once in receivership, the FDIC 
winds the financial firm down efficiently and orderly without forcing taxpayers to foot the 
bill.8    Supporters argue because the FDIC can facilitate the liquidation without taxpayer 
funds, the “too-big-to fail” problem is relinquished.9  The presumption of ending the “too 
big to fail” phenomenon has sparked an active debate on whether it is wise to entrust 
another regulatory body (considering the Federal Reserves regulations did not prevent the 
failure), with the difficult task of resolving it, when the proper mode of resolution lies in 
the federal bankruptcy system.10  
 Bankruptcy is favorable to an OLA receivership because it allows for unassisted 
failure of a financial firm.  Unassisted failure ensures that the government will not step in 
to bail out a financial firm in the event of distress.  Furthermore, if a bailout is no longer 
an option, institutions are prevented from taking risks with the belief that they will be 
rescued in the event they face financial distress.11   Moreover, by taking away the 
                                                 
5 Mark A. McDermott, "Analysis of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act", SKADDEN COMMENTARY ON THE DODD-FRANK ACT , July 
2010 at 1 (“Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, titled ‘Orderly Liquidation Authority,’ creates an entirely new 
insolvency regime for large, interconnected financial companies, including broker-dealers, whose failure 
poses a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.”).  
6 See generally id.  
7 See generally Report prepared by the Republican Staff of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House 
of Representatives, Failing to End Too-Big-To-Fail: An Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years 
Later, available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.   
11 The Bankruptcy Code And Financial Institution Insolvencies: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 13-14 
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expectation of support by the government, institutions will be more aware of the risks they 
are taking and are likely to borrow less.12  The decrease in the use of borrowing leads to 
less use of short-term funding and excessive leverage.  Accordingly, this leads to a 
reduced likelihood that a financial firm would need support in the first place.13  
 Despite the safeguards put in place by the Dodd-Frank Act, there remains the 
argument that after witnessing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Bankruptcy Code, 
as it reads today, is not an effective mechanism to resolve the failing of a systemically 
important financial institution (“SIFI”).14  Even if the critics are correct about bankruptcy 
law not being capable of providing resolution, the new Dodd-Frank regime makes clear 
that the OLA is a last resort, not a first resort to the Bankruptcy Code.  In a recent house 
subcommittee discussion on financial institution resolution, Jeffrey Lacker, president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Va., noted that both “Titles I and II of the Dodd-
Frank Act ‘clearly’ envision bankruptcy without government support as the ’first and most 
preferable option’ in the case of a failing financial institution.”15  Lacker argues that if 
resolution in bankruptcy without government support becomes the norm, “the incentives 
of market participants would be better aligned with our public policy goal of a financial 
system that effectively allocates capital and risks.”16  As mentioned above, this leads to 
                                                                                                                                                   
(2013)[hereinafter 2013 House Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker, President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond).  
12 Id. (explaining that “the problem-widely known as “too-big-to-fail” consists of two mutually reinforcing 
expectations”).  
13 Id.  
14 12 U.S.C. § 5464 (provid ing s tandards for systemically important financial market utilit ies and payment, 
clearing, or settlement activities ); see also Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systemically-
important-financial-institution-sifi.asp (“Any firm as designated by the U.S. Federal Reserve, whose 
collapse would pose a serious risk to the economy. Systematically  important financial institutions became 
the target of legislation and regulatory reform by the Obama Administration, due to issues concerning their 
consolidated supervision and regulation, following the financial crisis of 2008.”).  
15 Legislative Highlights; House Subcommittee Discusses Financial Institution Resolution Through the 
Code, AM. BANKR. INST . L.J., Jan.2014, at 10, 68.  
16 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker).  
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large financial firms wanting to be “less leveraged and less reliant on unstable short-term 
funding.”17  Hence, institutions and markets become resilient when faced with financial 
stress, and policy makers could credibly renounce the commitment to rescue distressed 
financial firms that potentially could disrupt the market place.18 
With that in mind, this Comment examines how distressed financial firms can be 
resolved through the bankruptcy process without drawing on emergency government 
support, exemplified by the government bailout during the 2008 financial crisis.  The 
bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with 
distressed and failing companies.  Now has come the time that financial companies are 
subjected to the bankruptcy process as well.  Bankruptcy should be favored as the primary 
mechanism for dealing with distressed and failing financial firms to deter reckless 
corporate decisions made in the penumbra of the bailout safety net, in lieu of bailouts.  
Applying bankruptcy principles such as impartiality, adherence to established precedent, 
and due process to failing financial firms sets a necessary bright-line standard to hold 
corporations fiscally responsible.  However, the Bankruptcy Code is not without flaw, 
enforcement of a uniform and predictable Bankruptcy Code is needed. The goals of this 
Comment are to examine the current problems with the Bankruptcy Code, in particular, 
issues arising with Chapter 11’s ability to reorganize a distressed financial firm and to 
explore proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code by way of the Financial Institution 
Bankruptcy Act of 2014 (“FIBA 2014”).   
                                                 
17 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker). 
18 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker). 
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Moreover, this Comment takes the position that the “single point of entry” 
(SPOE)19 approach is the most viable and efficient method to resolve a distressed financial 
institution that is organized with a holding company atop the corporate structure.  Through 
FIBA’s proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, the SPOE approach can be put to 
work through the bankruptcy process.  Additionally, this Comment argues that the 
proposed amendments allow the bankruptcy process to facilitate the orderly resolution of a 
financial firm, while minimizing negative effects to the financial markets (so-called 
systemic disruption), and protecting tax-payers from loss and maximizing value for 
stakeholders.  Finally, this Comment determines that a bankruptcy-style resolution, even 
under a revised Bankruptcy Code could work without government funding; however, the 
process should be safeguarded by having the government as a lender of last resort.   
Accordingly, Part II discusses why bankruptcy (particularly Chapter 11) is the 
preferred mechanism for resolution of systemically important financial firm.  Part III 
addresses the current problems with the Bankruptcy Code.  Part IV will discuss the 
proposed revisions made to the Bankruptcy Code by way of FIBA 2014.  Part V considers 
the remaining problems in the Bankruptcy Code.  Part VI concludes this Comment. 
II.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE PREFERENCE FOR BANKRUPTCY 
State and federal government have always played a significant role in banking, and 
is the main reason why the bankruptcy process has taken a secondary role to federal bank 
regulators when it comes to handling their insolvency.20  With the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, regulators maintain their position in banking, despite the fact that the 
bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with 
                                                 
19 For a discussion on SPOE, see infra part IV.  
20 See generally Kimberly Anne Summe, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LEHMAN BANKRUPTCY, in ENDING 
BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 65–67 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., Hoover Institution Press 2010).  
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distressed and failing companies.21  Bankruptcy is favored because of its impartiality, 
adherence to established precedent, and the fact that it is grounded in the principles of due 
process and rule of law.22  With the collapse of the financial sector in 2008, Congress had 
the opportunity to limit the divide between banking and bankruptcy and create a more 
unified system, but instead, pursuant to Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, it created a new 
system for addressing financial distress.  Despite a good faith attempt by Congress to 
establish an efficient and orderly resolution regime, the legislation has left gaps between 
bankruptcy resolution and the new federal resolution regime.  But as this Comment will 
discuss, proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code, by way of the FIBA 2014, allows for a 
regime integration that could narrow the gaps and provide a more unified system of 
resolution for a failing financial firm, which may account for both state and federal 
interests.  This Comment will first discuss why bankruptcy is the preferred mechanism for 
resolution of a systemically important financial institution and why the Bankruptcy Code 
must be revised to work in sync with the Dodd-Frank Act.  
The Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that the use of bankruptcy, not the OLA, is the 
preferred mechanism for resolution of SIFI.23  The OLA is only used in limited situations, 
such as where bankruptcy is not a viable option because of the possible risks posed to the 
U.S. financial market.24  The Dodd-Frank Act envisions bankruptcy as the preferred 
mechanism in two key places.  The first being in Title I, with the instituting of a resolution 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 82-3 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, co-chair of the 
Insolvency and Restructuring Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).  
24 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ADVISORY COMM. ON SYSTEMIC RESOLUTION: THE SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY 
RESOLUTION STRATEGY (2013).  
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plan, or so called “living will” under Section 165(d).25  Under Title I, covered financial 
institutions are required to put forth a plan, subject to review by the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Financial Stability oversight Council, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation that demonstrates how the financial institution will orderly resolve their 
affairs “in the event of material financial distress or failure”26 under the Bankruptcy 
Code.27  Essentially, because these resolution plans are tested in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
bankruptcy is seen to be the preferred mechanism of choice for a failing financial firm.  
Otherwise regulators would have required a financial firms plan to be tested under another 
mechanism, such as the OLA.28  The fact that these resolution plans will be tested against 
bankruptcy validates the inference that it is “critically important to the development of 
credible resolution plans under Title I . . . that bankruptcy law is effective in its ability to 
resolve SIFI’s.”29  
 The second point envisioning bankruptcy as the preferred resolution mechanism 
can be seen in the context of government regulators’ ability to initiate the actual OLA 
process.30  In order for Title II to be invoked, government regulators must find that 
bankruptcy is wanting; therefore, “by its own terms, bankruptcy is designed by the Dodd-
Frank Act to be the preferred resolution mechanism.”31  With the declaration of 
bankruptcy as the presumptive procedure for resolution, comes the necessity to equip the 
                                                 
25 See generally Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 98 (2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 House Hearing] (statement of Thomas H. Jackson, Distinguished University Professor & 
President Emeritus University of Rochester.)  
26 12 U.S.C. §5301-165(d)(1) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5366 (d)(1) (2012). 
27 See generally Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd- Frank Living Wills Primer: What You 
Need to Know Now, AM. BANKR. INST . J., Aug. 2012, at 34.  This looks correct to me according to rule 16.5  
28 See 2014 House Hearing, supra note 25, at 99 (statement of Thomas H. Jackson).  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.; see also Remarks by Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman,Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on 
Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act before the Volker Alliance Program (Oct. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.fdic/gov/news/news/speeches/spoet1313.html.  
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Bankruptcy Code with the proper tools so that it may accomplish the goals of minimizing 
losses and placing them on appropriate, pre identified, parties; minimize systemic 
consequences; and prevent a government bail-out.32  Moreover, these goals are in line with 
the two goals of the Dodd-Frank Act: (1) limiting the risk of contemporary finance; and 
(2) reducing the damage caused by the failure of a large financial institution.33  
A. Bankruptcy Is A Superior Resolution Mechanism.    
The OLA of Title II is an inferior alternative to the well-established legal 
landscape of bankruptcy for the simple reason that it “imbues the FDIC with unfettered 
discretion to exercise its orderly liquidation authority.”34  Bankruptcy has an already-
developed legal landscape and is administered by an impartial tribunal with clear rules in 
place.35  Together, the clear rules administered by learned bankruptcy judges provide for 
the application of a uniform resolution regime that allows financial institutions to properly 
plan their “living will” under Title I in the event of an insolvency or financial crisis.36  
Despite the fact that the FDIC has announced that it supports the idea that 
bankruptcy, not the OLA, should be the presumptive resolution procedure, an ongoing 
debate still exists on whether the OLA is preferable to bankruptcy.37  Supporters of the 
OLA argue that orderly liquidation is preferable to bankruptcy because bankruptcy 
                                                 
32 2014 House Hearing, supra note 25, at 99–100 (statement of Thomas H. Jackson).  
33 See generally David Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011).  
34 James H.M. Sprayregen & Stephen E. Hessler, Too Much Discretion To Succeed: Why A Modified 
Bankruptcy Code Is Preferable To Title II Of the Dodd-Frank Act, FED. RES., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/June/20110607/OP-1418/OP 
1418_053111_80002_310357154312_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 9th 2015, 4:19 PM) (Submission in response to 
Federal Reserve Request for information relating to Dodd-Frank Act section 216 Study regarding the 
resolution of financial companies under the bankruptcy code).  
35 Id. at 2–4.  
36 Id.   
37  The Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 2nd Sess. 20–21 (2014) 
[hereinafter FIBA Hearing] (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, co-chair of the Insolvency and Restructuring 
Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).  
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proceedings can be slow and may allow failing institutions to linger in Chapter 11, rather 
than just being liquidated.38  Opponents of the OLA argue that two potential options for 
dealing with resolution result in uncertainty and cause greater systemic risk.39  What 
seems to be even more problematic is the huge amount of discretionary power given to the 
FDIC, which can essentially “pick winners and losers”40 in deciding which firms would be 
liquidated.41  This type of vast discretion leaves certain creditors at the mercy of the FDIC 
and can lead to fundamental unfairness. Moreover, creditor uncertainty on how a SIFI 
would be resolved during a time of financial distress can lead to an overall decline in 
investing and would create more confusion, which would further result in some form of 
adverse systemic risk.42  Alternatively, bankruptcy has a proper foundation already in 
place, and with certain provisions added to the Bankruptcy Code, the problems caused by 
having multiple resolution mechanisms can be avoided.  As stated by Congressman 
Bachus,43 ranking member on the Financial Services Committee, “bankruptcy is open, 
transparent, and has clear rules, precedents, and a judge, which ensures fairness. ”44  
Contrarily, OLA procedure would be carried out “behind closed doors”45 and use 
government funds as regulators see fit, further supporting the notion that SIFI’s must be 
knowingly subjected to bankruptcy proceedings in the event of insolvency.46 
                                                 
38 Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor's Perspective , 15 N.C. BANKING 
INST . 259, 263 (2011).  
39 Id.  
40 Id.; see also 156 CONG. REC. H5223, 5226 (daily ed. June 30, 2010 ) (Statement of Rep. Garret).  
41 Hardee, supra note 38, at 263.  
42  Hardee, supra note 38, at 264.  
43 Spencer Thomas Bachus III is a former U.S. Representative for the state of Alabama.  He served from 
1993–2015.  He is a member of the Republican Party.  As a member of the Republican Party, he served as 
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee (2011–2013).  
44 Id. (quoting156 CONG. REC. H4289, 4289 (daily ed. June 9, 2010) (statement of Rep. Bachus).  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
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Bankruptcy scholars such as Jeffery Lacker, argue that the bankruptcy process is 
preferable because "the alternatives are worse" and require the discretionary use of federal 
funds, which is an "unstable and unsustainable approach."47  In response to a question 
about "too big to fail," Lacker said, “the combination of an enhanced Bankruptcy Code 
and the living will process will give regulators confidence that should a large financial 
institution experience distress, they will be able to resolve it through the bankruptcy 
process without extraordinary government assistance.” 48   
B. Title II and The Creation of The OLA Fail In Preventing Big Banks From 
Believing They Are “Too-Big-to-Fail.” 
 
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal quoted the FDIC’s vice Chairman, 
Thomas Hoeing who stated, “my major worry is the perception that, since the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, we have really become a much more sound and stable financial 
system, I question that.”49 Mr. Hoeing’s concerns stem from the belief that big banks 
remain risky and they benefit from the perception that the U.S. would rescue them in a 
crisis.50  Despite the fact that Dodd-Frank makes taxpayer bailouts illegal, the banks and 
policy makers choose not to believe what is on the paper.51  The reason is that the law 
allows for temporary government support and sends a message that banks will remain 
open for business in the face of insolvency, giving them an incentive to continue with 
risky business models.52  In order to relinquish this ideology, banks must be forced by 
regulators to put forth a proper “living will” that avoids taxpayer bailouts and has a 
                                                 
47 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11 at 108 (statement of Jeffery Lacker in response to Rep. Jason 
Smith question asking Lacker to explain the benefits of resolving financial firms through the bankruptcy 
process).  
48 Id. (“Once this process becomes the norm, it will also shift incentives in financial markets and lead to less 
short-term funding, less maturity transformation, and less market fragility .”). 
49 See Ryan Tracy, The Man Who Has Wall Street Banks on Edge, WALL ST . J., Sept. 26, 2014, at C1-C4.  
50 Id.    
51 Id.   
52 Id.   
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credible path in bankruptcy.53  Therefore, in order to hinder financial firms from 
continuing the operation of risky business models and to prevent these firms from 
believing the Government will bail them out, distressed financial firms must be subjected 
to the bankruptcy process.   
Moreover, if firms are subjected to a bankruptcy process, it becomes very 
important to properly equip the Bankruptcy Code with tools to necessary to facilitate the 
resolution of a failing financial firm.  If the Bankruptcy Code is left in its current state, 
financial firms cannot adequately plan their “living will”’ and the possibility of the bailout 
may still seem viable in the eyes of a financial firm.  If the “living wills” are deemed 
adequate by regulators, resolution of a firm should, in hindsight, be possible in 
bankruptcy, which supports the perception that financial institutions can no longer assume 
they will be put in receivership and bailed out by taxpayers.54   
Therefore, if these financial institutions know they will be subjected to bankruptcy 
and because of their “living wills” understand how they are going to liquidate or be 
reorganized, bankruptcy could theoretically damper a financial institution’s assumption 
that they will be rescued in the event of a financial crisis.55 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 Contra Abby McCloskey & Paul H. Kupiec, Why the ‘Living Will’ Process Sets Banks Up for Failure, 
AM. BANKER (Aug. 11, 2014, (April 17, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-
the-living-will-process-sets-banks-up-for-failure-1069285-1.html (arguing that “living wills” allow 
regulators to restructure and change companies). 
55 The presumption of not being bailed out by the government also has to do with living wills being 
developed with the assumption of guaranteed financing in bankruptcy, through the form of Debtor in 
Possession funding.  Many critics argue that this is unrealistic.  See Gina Chon, Fed Blow to Banks over 
“Living Wills,” FIN. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014,  4:22 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/617d442c -24c4-11e4-
ae78-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3NhofJlY8 (discussing that banks are precluded from 
assuming funding through the discount window during a time of financial stress).  
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More importantly, Title II’s purpose to prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts of major 
financial institutions does not justify supplanting the Bankruptcy Code with the OLA.56  
Regulators point to the ad hoc bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the impetus for the 
enactment of the OLA pursuant to Title II.  Regulators believe that if the Lehman Brothers 
estate had been placed in OLA receivership, it would have “imposed a lesser disruption on 
financial markets, and resulted in a greater recovery for Lehman’s creditors, than . . .  
Lehman Brothers’ filing under chapter 11.”57  Not only is this highly unlikely, but also the 
FDIC makes some peculiar criticisms to the Bankruptcy Code, stating that there are no 
parallel provisions in the Bankruptcy Code to effectively facilitate a transfer of a financial 
company’s assets, liabilities, and operations to “one or more bridge financial companies 
for preservation of going concern, while less assets remain in receivership and are 
liquidated.”58  A Section 363 sale,59 however, expressly authorizes the sale of property to 
an estate (analogous to a bridge company), and we can look to the automotive bankruptcy 
cases to see a very similar situation in the transfer of assets to a bridge company.60  
Further, if the goal of Title II is to liquidate failing companies, why is the FDIC 
contemplating restructuring?  Is that not why we have the Bankruptcy Code?  It seems that 
regulators, despite pronouncing bankruptcy as the resolution vehicle, are attempting yet 
another power-grab in an effort to remain relevant in the world of bank insolvency.  In 
                                                 
56 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note 34, at 4.  
57 Sprayregen & Hessler supra note 34, at 4.  
58 Sprayregen & Hessler supra note 34, at 4. 
59 “Section 363 refers to the portion of the Bankruptcy Code that authorizes a debtor to sell its assets ‘outside 
the ordinary course of business.’”  Case S. Weil, Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code – A Tool for Buying 
and Selling Financially Distressed Assets, (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.lawmoss.com/content/uploads/2013/09/MBNews -2013-8-Section-363.pdf  Sales of assets 
“outside the ordinary course of business” are sales that are either unlike the sales that the debtor engages in 
his ordinary course of business.  Id. “A Section 363 sale transfers the debtor’s assets to a buyer in a discrete 
transaction that will be approved by the bankruptcy court if the debtor can demonstrate a “substantial 
business justification” for the sale.”  Id.  
60 See Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy As Bailout , 6 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 79, 81 (2011). 
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addition, the FDIC points to the Bankruptcy Code’s inability to guarantee access to debtor 
in possession (“DIP”)61 financing, contrary to Title II where the FDIC is permitted to 
borrow funds from the Department of Treasury to make loans to, or guarantee, financial 
company obligations.62  The FDIC position is that if the Bankruptcy Code cannot quickly 
provide a funding source to a distressed SIFI, the delay in obtaining financing may 
destabilize the market.  Additionally, DIP financing usually takes time to obtain and 
comes coupled with use restrictions from the lender.  Typically these restrictions will 
devalue a financial firm and further limit their option in reorganizing or liquidation.63   This 
Comment does take the stance that federal funding will likely be needed to facilitate the 
resolution of a SIFI, but it does not draw the conclusion that the OLA must be the 
resolution tool in order to provide this type of funding.  If the goal of Title II is to “prevent 
bailouts, minimize moral hazard and market instability, . . . it is entirely counterintuitive 
not to require that DIP financing be subject to reasonable limitations such as market 
testing, creditor scrutiny, secured lender consent and conditions, the grant of additional 
security interest, and court approval.”64  The existence of providing federal funding in 
some form or another will continue to be an active debate, especially when contemplating 
                                                 
61 Upon a debtor filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition the debtor is now called the “debtor in possession” 
and takes the role of a trustee in bankruptcy.  Douglas J. Whaley & Jeffrey W. Morris,  PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW 391 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business 2013); see also Marshall S. Huebner, Debtor-In-Possession Financing, THE RMA J., Apr. 2005, at 
30, 31.  
The DIP typically finds itself in need of credit immediately after initiating a Chapter 11 
case. While most of its pre-bankruptcy liabilities are frozen, the company is likely to need 
cash immediately to cover payroll and the up-front costs of stabilizing the business. DIP 
loans are typically asset- based, revolving working-capital facilities put into place at the 
out- set of Chapter 11 to provide both immediate cash as well as ongoing working capital 
during the reorganization process. Perhaps most important, DIP financing helps the 
company restore vendor and customer confidence in the company’s ability to maintain its 
liquidity.  Id.  when block-quoting, you don’t need quotation marks  
62 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note34, at 5–6.  
63 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note 34, at 5–6; see FDIC QUARTERLY, THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION OF 
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 31– 49 (2011)  
64 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note34, at 6.  
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the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon.  But when taking a step back from the debate, this 
Comment argues that a revised Bankruptcy Code can facilitate the resolution of a SIFI 
without government funding but may be more effective if federal funding is in place as a 
last resort.  Regardless, whether the funding is deemed necessary or not for resolution of a 
SIFI, the arguments above demonstrate the preference for bankruptcy and the unnecessary 
enactment of the OLA.   As validated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, problems do 
exist with the ability of the bankruptcy process to handle resolution of a SIFI, which will 
be explored below.  But by revising the Bankruptcy Code, the possibility of a government 
bailout is limited and financial firms that become distressed will have a properly 
formulated plan to be facilitated in bankruptcy.  
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE 
“One of the most important questions facing policymakers today is whether the 
bankruptcy process is, or with modifications could be, a suitable method for handling the 
failure of complex financial firms.”65  As suggested above, this Comment proposes that 
the Bankruptcy Code, as left by the Dodd-Frank Act to be the default mechanism, needs to 
be revised to accommodate these complex financial institutions and accomplish its 
presumptive goal of providing orderly resolution.  This section of the Comment explores 
why the Bankruptcy Code needs to be revised in the light of its use during the 2008 
bankruptcy of Lehman brothers.  Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008.  Their filing became the largest and notably most complex filing in 
history, mainly because of its 209 subsidiaries in 21 different countries.66  “The experience 
                                                 
65 Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, How Well Does Bankruptcy Work When Large Financial 
Firms Fail? Some Lessons from Lehman Brothers, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www2.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011/2011-23.cfm.  
66 Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail- In? And How!, 20 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., March, 2014 at 1–3.   
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of resolving Lehman Brothers in the bankruptcy courts has since led to an active debate 
regarding the effectiveness of U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings for complex financial 
institutions.”67  Many critics of the bankruptcy process believe today’s distressed financial 
institutions would face the same problems as Lehman Brothers in bankruptcy, but are 
subsequently even more complex and involve multiple facets of business.68  For example, 
the remaining large financial institutions involve investment banking, commercial 
banking, and insurance underwriting.69  These financial institutions involved in the 
commercial banking world (which Lehman Brothers was not involved in) are capable of 
posing far greater risks to the financial system and to the economy, mainly because these 
brick-and-mortar establishments are integrated into the “real economy.”70  Commentators 
argue that bankruptcy is ineffective for resolution of SIFIs for a number of reasons, 
starting with the length of the actual bankruptcy proceeding.71  It has been argued that the 
bankruptcy process takes too long and the lack of speed in bankruptcy prevents the 
preservation of value and the uncertainty about the potential duration of the automatic stay 
can further dissipate the value of assets.72   
A. Qualified Financial Contracts Exemption to Automatic Stay  
 
The key feature to a bankruptcy proceeding is the automatic stay.  This feature 
“prohibits creditors from taking steps to collect what they are owed once a debtor has filed 
                                                 
67 Id.   
68 Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B Of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485, 487–88 
(2012).  
69 Id.   
70 Id.  
71 See generally id.  
72 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STUDY OF THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL COMPANIES 
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (2011).  
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a bankruptcy petition.”73  In effect, the stay halts the “race of diligence”74 by creditors that 
might otherwise lead to haphazard liquidation of the firm’s assets, and instead allows for a 
more coordinated resolution of the firm’s financial distress.75  Since the current 
Bankruptcy Code was enacted, Congress has gradually expanded exemptions for 
derivatives, repurchase agreements (“repos”)76, and other “qualified financial”77 contracts 
(QFCs).78  Therefore, investors who are holding QFCs have the ability to immediately 
terminate and net-out their contracts or liquidate the collateral on their claims once a party 
has defaulted or filed for bankruptcy.79  The problem is that these financial contracts are 
the primary assets of financial institutions, and the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor 
provisions permit a “run” on these assets.80  To use Lehman Brothers as an example: when 
they filed for bankruptcy, QFC’s were exempted from the automatic stay, preference 
provisions, and the bankruptcy “anti-ipso” facto clause rules.81  This in turn caused the 
                                                 
73 David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy , 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 158 (2012).  
74 Race of diligence: this means that the first to perfect or to turn an inchoate into a choate lien wins. This 
generally must be done item by item because there is no general levy power. A secured creditor will win 
over an unsecured one. The first to record a judgment usually has the right to the good. Cite the source here 
as string.   
75 See Skeel, supra note 73, at 158.  
76 A repurchase agreement is a form of “short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities. The 
dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on an overnight basis, and buys them back the 
following day.” INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repurchaseagreement.asp 
77 See Pellerin & Walter, infra note 91, at 19 note. 27 (“In the Bankruptcy Code, contracts exempt from the 
automatic stay are referred to as ‘safe harbor contracts’ . . .The federal Depository institution act and the 
Dodd-Frank Act refer to the safe harbor contracts as QFCs. Since safe harbor contracts and QFCs generally 
refer to the same types of contracts, we will use the term QFC to refer to both, which is consistent with  
industry practice.”). 
78 Skeel, supra note 73, at 158.  
79 See Hardee, supra note 38, at 278.  
80 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 72, at 7.  
81 “The phrase ipso facto is Latin for ‘by the fact itself.’  Ipso facto clauses are sometimes included in lease 
and purchase contracts, and they assert that if the lessee or purchaser becomes insolvent, or files for 
bankruptcy protection, then the contract has been breached.  In other words, under such a clause the very act 
of filing for bankruptcy protection constitutes a breach of contract (hence the appellation, ipso facto clause) 
that absolves the other party of any further contract obligations .” Nicholas Gebelt, Southern California 
Bankruptcy Law Blog, available at http://www.southerncaliforniabankruptcylawblog.com/2012/11/19/ipso-
facto-clauses-in-bankruptcy/.  
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‘spreads’ on credit default contracts (“CDS”)82 insuring Lehman Brothers’ debt to be seen 
as minimal instead of large (as default risks rise so does the spread).83  Therefore, if the 
market recognized the CDS spread as large, market participants would have known 
Lehman Brothers was at the brink of insolvency.  Because of the QFC’s exemption from 
the automatic stay, the market did not interpret Lehman Brothers as being at the threshold 
of default or insolvency until immediately before its collapse.84 Additionally, the belief by 
CDS protection sellers that they would be bailed out if Lehman Brothers collapsed kept 
the price of CDSs low and therefore, the market saw Lehman Brothers as being in good 
financial health.  Moreover, the special protections for derivatives added to this distortion 
and amplified the losses Lehman Brothers unexpected collapse caused in two ways.85  
First, bankruptcy’s special treatment of repurchase agreements invited a form of 
accounting manipulation used by Lehman Brothersat the end of each quarter to disguise 
                                                 
82 Stephano Giglio, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk , Harvard University, Job 
Market Paper (Jan. 2011)  
Credit default swaps are credit derivatives that allow the trans fer of the credit risk of a 
firm between two agents for a predetermined amount of time. In a typical CDS contract, 
the protection seller offers the protection buyer insurance against the default of an 
underlying bond issued by a certain company (the reference entity). In the event of 
default by the reference entity, the seller commits to buy the bond for a price equal to its 
face value from the protection buyer. In exchange for the insurance, the buyer pays a 
quarterly premium, called the CDS spread, quoted as an annualized percentage of the 
notional value insured. If default occurs, the contract terminates, and the quarterly 
payments are interrupted. If default does not occur during the life of the contract, the 
contract terminates at its maturity date. A credit default swap is an insurance contract 
against the default of a firm, for example a financial institution. The ‘CDS’ spread 
corresponds to the yearly insurance premium. 
83 Vincent Ryan, Do CDS Spreads Tell the Truth?, CFO (Mar. 19, 2011), http://ww2.cfo.com/banking-
capital-markets/2011/05/do-cds-spreads-tell-the-truth-2/.  
84 Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123, 123–131 (2010) 
(noting that a credit default swap (CDS) provides the buyer with a payout if some underlying debt issued by 
the “referenced entity” defaults and that the value of the CDS is entirely dependent on the properties of the 
underlying reference obligations); see e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 
11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 410–11 (2007); Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the 
next Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 169 (2008)); see also Skeel, supra note 
73, at 164–65; John B. Taylor, DEFINING SYSTEMIC RISK OPERATIONALLY, in ENDING GOVERNMENT 
BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM, 46 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2010)(arguing bankruptcy causes runs on 
repurchase agreements and fire sales of collateral underlying closed-out derivatives).  
85 Id.    
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the amount of its leverage.  These transactions, now known as “105 transactions”86 are 
ordinarily characterized as financing for accounting purposes.  However, since these 
secured transactions are exempt from bankruptcy law, Lehman Brothers was able to 
characterize these repurchase agreement transactions as sales and shave millions in debt 
from their balance sheets.  This recharacterization followed a delay in the recognition of 
Lehman Brothers’ true financial condition and as stated by David Skeel,87 “almost 
certainly magnified the costs of its failure.”88 
The second contribution, by way of the derivatives exclusion to Lehman’s losses, 
can be seen by J.P. Morgan’s ability to seize and sell Lehman’s assets right before 
Lehman folded.89  Lehman Brothers owed J.P. Morgan twenty billion dollars before they 
filed for bankruptcy and because derivative contracts are exempted from bankruptcy’s 
automatic stay provision, Lehman Brothers could not prevent J.P. Morgan from seizing 
and selling Lehman assets in lieu of the twenty billion.90  Creditors who are able to rush in 
and seize assets are likely to grab assets, which are fundamental to the firm’s continued 
operations, so called “going-concern assets.”91  Going concern assets are important to a 
                                                 
86 See generally Michael J. De La Merced & Julia Werdigier, The Origins of Lehman’s ‘Repo 105 ,’ 
 (March 12, 2010 7:02 a.m.) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/the-brit ish-origins-of-lehmans-
accounting-gimmick/?_r=0 (“Repo 105 transactions were worth 105 percent of the cash it received”); See 
also INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repo-105.asp (“An accounting trick in which a 
company classifies a short-term loan as a sale and subsequently uses the cash proceeds from said sale to 
reduce its liabilities. In the repo market, companies are able to gain access to the excess funds of other firms 
for short periods in exchange for collateral usually a bond”).  
87 David Skeel is the author of The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its 
(Unintended) Consequences (Wiley, 2011), as well as numerous articles and other publications. He has been 
interviewed on The News Hour, Nightline, Chris Matthews’ Hardball (MSNBC), National Public Radio, and 
Marketplace, among others, and has been quoted in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington 
Post and other newspapers and magazines.  
88 David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 165 (2012).  
89 Id.  
90 Id.   
91 See Sabrina R. Pellerin & John R. Walter, Orderly Liquidation Authority as an Alternative to Bankruptcy, 
98 ECON. 1, 3–4 (2012);  LAW LIB- AM. LAW AND LEGAL INFO, http://law.jrank.org/pages/7169/Going-
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firm that might be successfully reorganized.  Such assets include operating equipment or 
property essential to the firms operations.  Furthermore, assets sold off separately are 
almost never worth more than if bundled together with other assets.  This causes a 
reduction in the total amount creditors receive if the firm is liquidated and can prevent a 
firm from reorganization because of the asset seizures.92  Despite the possibility to receive 
more if assets are kept intact and bundled, creditors not subject to the automatic stay are 
individually incentivized to be the first to grab assets in an effort to recover a higher 
proportion of their debts than creditors who are slow to react.  The counterargument to 
permitting the expansive protection for derivatives and repurchase agreements is to 
achieve the intended goal of “minimizing the systemic risks potentially arising from 
certain interrelated financial activities and markets.”93  
                                                                                                                                                   
Concern-Value.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015); see also  WEST ’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437701998.html.  
Going Concern value is the value inherent in an active, established company as opposed 
to a firm that is not yet established. As a component of business value, going concern 
value recognizes the many advantages that an existing business has over a new business, 
such as avoidance of start-up costs and improved operating efficiency. In this sense, the 
going concern value of a firm represents the difference between the value of an 
established firm and the value of a start-up firm. Going concern value also indicates the 
value of a firm as an operating, active whole, rather than merely as distinct items of 
property. U.S. Bankruptcy law, for example, has recognized the need to preserve going 
concern value when reorganizing businesses in order to maximize recoveries by creditors 
and shareholders (11 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.). Bankruptcy laws seek to preserve going 
concern value whenever possible by promoting the reorganization, as opposed to the 
liquidation, of businesses.  WAS THE EMPHASIS ON “COMPONENT” IN THE 
ORIGINAL OR IS IT ADDED?  
92Contra Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 3 (noting that QFCs can be immediately closed out because 
the collateral backing them will naturally not be complementary to other assets of the firm, nor will QFC 
collateral be vital to the firm’s going-concern value. Such as exceedingly marketable or cash securities, 
which can be eliminated without undercutting the firm’s ability to create loans or other financial products. 
Refuting this argument is that security backing some QFCs are firm specific and not all QFCs should be 
treated evenly).  
93 See Sabrina supra note 91,  at 22 (citing Douglas H, Jones, Senior Deputy General Counsel, FDIC, 
Statement on Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, United States Senate (Mar. 25, 1999); see also Soo J. Yim & 
William J. Perlstein, “The Effect of Proposed Amendments to U.S Insolvency and Banking Laws on 
Transactions Involving Securities, Commodities and Other Financial Contracts, 3” Prepared in connection 
with the American Bar Association 2001 spring meeting section of business law business bankruptcy 
committee forum on derivatives and proposed financial contract netting legislation (March 24, 2001) 
(“Immediate termination of outstanding contracts and liquidation of collateral facilities the acquisition of 
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Conversely, the idea of preventing systemic risk by allowing the safe harbor 
provision to apply to QFCs, did not prove accurate during the financial crisis.  This is 
because, despite one form of systemic risk being reduced, the exemption promotes another 
form of systemic risk by allowing runs on repos94 and fire sales95 of the collateral 
underlying closed-out derivative contracts.96  Again, in order to demonstrate the effects 
the exemption had on financial firms and the market, this Comment looks to the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  On the day of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, 
733,000 of their 930,000 derivative counterparties sought to terminate their contracts.97  
This rush to close out positions and demand collateral added to the already-failing and 
weakened Lehman Brothers, while causing a negative effect on the financial market as 
parties rushed to sell their Lehman Brother shares and buy new positions with 
counterparties.98  Bankruptcy scholar Stephen J. Lubben99 argues that the 2005 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code broadened the scope of “repurchase agreements” by 
including mortgage loans and interests in mortgage loans.100  This in effect facilitated the 
already substantial use of short-term repo financing and contributed to the losses by 
encouraging excessive lending to mortgage originators.101  These arguments demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                                   
replacement contracts, reduces uncertainty and uncontrollable risk, improves liquidity and reduces the risk 
of rapid devaluation of collateral in volatile markets”).  
94 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 n.39 (defining “runs on repos” as a situation where counterparties seize 
the collateral underlying these deposit-like instruments).  
95 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 n.40 (noting that the “phrase ‘fire sale’ typically refers to the possibility 
that the sale of an asset might yield a lower-than-typical price if holders of one type of asset attempt to sell 
en masse”). In comparison, the ‘typical’ (non-fire) price will result if sales are distributed over time.  Id. 
96 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 (citing Edwards and Morrison 2005, Taylor 2010, Archarya et al. 2011).  
97 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23.  
98 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 130–32.    
99 Stephen J. Lubben is the holder of the Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & 
Business Ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law and is an expert in the field of corporate finance and 
governance, corporate restructuring, financial distress , and debt.  He is also the In Debt columnist for the 
New York Times' Dealbook page. 
100 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 130–32.    
101 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 138–40.  
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that bankruptcy’s special QFC treatment, as applied to SIFI’s in financial distress, would 
not be ideal and a change is warranted in order to allow bankruptcy to be the proper 
mechanism for resolution.  
B. Bankruptcy’s Limited Sources of Funding.  
Another problem with bankruptcy, as it currently exists, is its limited capability of 
providing adequate funding to a financial firm who is attempting to reorganize in Chapter 
11.  A firm attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy can obtain funds from a dismal array of 
sources, one consisting of the firm’s very own assets or in the case of reorganization, 
potential debtor in possession (“DIP”)102 financing.103  Obtaining DIP financing is 
essential to the successful reorganization of a firm since it allows debtors to maintain 
sufficient liquidity to operate while reorganizing in Chapter 11.  However, when faced 
with a financial crisis, funding must become available quickly in order to successfully 
reorganize.104  This may be a difficult task for financial firms because of their inherent line 
of business.  Assets of financial firms are usually highly obscure to outsiders and without 
careful analyses are very difficult to value.105  As a result, DIP loans, which rely on the 
free market, may be very difficult to obtain in a time of financial distress.106  “Section 364 
of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a post-petition creditor to receive priority in the 
distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate superior to all other creditors of the 
                                                 
102 For an explanation of debtor in possession financing see supra note 61.. 
103 See Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 13–14 (In reorganization, the distressed corporation, the debtor, 
continues to manage, or own, the troubled entity. Any loans to the distressed corporation are therefore loans 
to the DIP. Id.  “Such loans are often senior to all former-prior to the bankruptcy filing-debts of the bankrupt 
firm.  The prospect of being senior to other creditors allows funding to flow as long as creditors can be 
convinced that the firm is likely to survive and therefore repay”).  Id.   
104 Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 15.  
105 Pellerin & Walter,supra note 91, at 15.  
106 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 83–85 (statement of Stephen J. Lubben, Harvey Washington Wiley 
Chair in Corporate Goverance & Business Ethics Seton Hall University School of Law).   
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estate… in order to make it possible to obtain funding.”107  Regardless, if financial 
conditions do not allow the financial firm to obtain funding, there is no provision in the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizing the government to extend credit on this special preference 
basis; however, the U.S. and Canadian governments did fill the void when Chrysler and 
GM (collectively “GM”) were unable to obtain DIP financing.108  The financial firm is 
then faced with the dilemma of liquidating or obtaining government monetary support.  
Some critics would say that any support from the government is a bailout and undermines 
the entire bankruptcy process, regardless of how and why regulators say it is not.109  This 
Comment does not take a position as to whether any form of federal funding is a bailout, 
but it does take the position that some form of government funding as a backstop is 
necessary when facilitating the orderly resolution of a SIFI, even when deploying a bail-in 
strategy such as the SPOE, as discussed below.110  A major problem with bankruptcy is 
that, when dealing with a SIFI, it is simply unrealistic to count on free market DIP 
financing during a financial crisis.  The use of Chapter 11 to reorganize GM demonstrates 
an effective way for the bankruptcy system to facilitate government funding to a financial 
firm without undermining the bankruptcy system itself.  Conclusively, it is argued that the 
Bankruptcy Code should explicitly permit the government the capability of extending 
credit to a financial firm during times when DIP financing is unobtainable.111,  
                                                 
107 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 72, at 13.  
108 Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 60, at 80–81.  
109 Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 60, at 80–81. 
110 See discussion infra Part IV.  
111 See Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 16 n.16 (“An alternative to bailouts or OLA that would address 
the problem of a lack of DIP funding as a result of SIFI opacity is to allow a troubled SIFI to enter 
reorganization, and permit the government to make DIP loans to the bankrupt firm.  The government could 
quickly provide DIP funds to keep the firm from operating but the bankruptcy process could handle all other 
aspects of the resolution”); Contra Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 
Speech at the Global Society of Fellows Conference at the University of Richmond: Ending ‘Too Big To 
Fail’ is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013) (noting that a firm who properly manages liquidity in normal 
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But as the Bankruptcy Code stands, without revisions, the limited sources of 
funding available to a financial firm during reorganization lends to the belief that systemic 
effects may still occur.  If a financial firm does not have access to secured liquidity after 
its recapitalization, it shortchanges the objectives and goals of recapitalization in the first 
place.  Sure, bankruptcy would still be fine to let firms fail as Lehman Brothers did, but if 
the objective is to reorganize, some form of a lender of last resort need be in place.112  
C. Bankruptcy’s Domestic and Global Disruption  
Financial institutions comparable in size to Lehman Brothers have an extensive 
domestic and global reach.  Therefore, some of the most disastrous consequences of such 
an institutions failure occur outside the United States.  In the case of Lehman Brothers, 
several Asian and London based subsidiaries failed, in part due to immediate loss of 
access to funds in Lehman Brothers management system.113 The worldwide effect of 
Lehman Brothers default confirmed the need for a resolution strategy that considered 
worldwide effects of financial institution distress.114  In spite of these worldwide systemic 
effects, Dodd-Frank did not address international consequences of a SIFI’s collapse and 
neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the OLA are equipped to properly deal with worldwide 
systemic effects.115  Seemingly, regulators have suggested that SIFI’s consider the effects 
their financial distress may have on foreign entities when putting forth their living will or 
resolution plan, but if these plans are tested against the Bankruptcy Code it becomes even 
                                                                                                                                                   
times prior to experiencing financial distress should be able line up funding without the support of 
government-provided DIP financing).  
112 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33.  
113 David A. Skeel, Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative , FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP PAPER 
949, 6 (2014), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/949. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 9.  
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more evident that the bankruptcy process must be able to resolve or hinder the worldwide 
effects of a distressed SIFI.116   
 As will be discussed below, if the SPOE approach works as intended, it will 
insulate foreign subsidiaries from a default by the parent company and limit the negative 
effects outside of the United States.117  
D. Hybrid Approaches: The Call for Uniformity  
A major concern when resolving SIFIs is the possible subjection to a barrage of 
insolvency regimes, both in the United States and in other countries.118  Undoubtedly, the 
involvement of multiple insolvency regimes complicated the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, and will continue to plague the resolution of SIFIs, if uncertainty exists on 
which resolution regime will be employed during a time of financial distress.119  Title I 
requires SIFIs to put forth a “living will” that will be tested under bankruptcy; a 
subsidiary, however, may be subject to another resolution regime.120  As a result, 
resolution plans tend to adopt a hybrid approach in which some entities may be 
recapitalized or sold while others are wound-down.121  Advocates such as Donald 
Bernstein argue that “[t]he simplest way to avoid competing resolution proceedings would 
be to have a clear path to a single point of entry approach to financial firm insolvencies 
under the Bankruptcy Code.”122  This would avoid hybrid approaches, which cause higher 
implementation risk and the probability of larger losses for creditors and shareholders than 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 See infra pp. 25–26. 
118 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
119 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
120 Thomas H. Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions: A Proposed Bankruptcy Code Alternative, 
BANKING PERSPECTIVE, Q. 1 2014, at 22, 24.  
121 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
122 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein); See discussion on 
SPOE infra Part IV.    
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a pure SPOE approach.123  Accordingly, as will be discussed supra, reforms that add tools 
to facilitate a SPOE approach to resolution in bankruptcy can eliminate many of these 
problems.  
IV. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 2014  
 FIBA 2014 is proposed legislation that amends the Bankruptcy Code by inserting 
tools which will allow it to facilitate a whole-firm recapitalization approach to resolving 
SIFIs.  Particularly, the bill creates Subchapter V of Chapter 11, under which the assets of 
a financially troubled institution would be transferred to a bridge company, while its stock 
and long-term unsecured debt would be left behind in the old institution.  The SIFI’s 
property becomes the property of the newly-formed bridge company and ceases to be the 
property of the bankruptcy estate.124  Supporters of the bill argue that whole-firm 
recapitalization (SPOE approach), as a means of resolving SIFI’s, is by far the best 
approach without taxpayer-funded bailouts.125  The SPOE approach to resolution is 
designed to avoid the abrupt unraveling of a financial firm and provide an efficient means 
to quickly disperse a distressed financial firm’s losses on to shareholders and creditors so 
that “valuable components of the firm can continue business under new ownership and 
management, or be wound down in an orderly manner as going concerns.”126  
Additionally, the primary purpose of the SPOE approach under FIBA 2014 “is to 
engender sufficient liquidity for the bridge financial company, to obtain private-sector 
financing by creating a ‘clean’ balance sheet through the transfer to it of assets stripped of 
                                                 
123 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
124 Bruce Grohsgal, Legislative Update, Why Recent SPOE For SIFI’s Fail, 33-12 ABIJ 10 (2014) (citing 
H.R. 5421, 113 Cong. (2014), § 1185(a)).  
125 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 2–3 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
126 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
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liabilities against which it can then borrow from the private sector.”127  Therefore, the 
bill’s proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code allow for resolution of a SIFI in a 
manner that:  1) allocates losses among proper parties; 2) maximizes value for 
stakeholders; 3) minimizes systemic disruption and moral hazard; and yet 4) protects 
taxpayers from loss.128  Most importantly, if bankruptcy is now capable of resolution, 
these enhanced bankruptcy procedures allegedly "create a level playing field between 
Wall Street and Main Street and … assure [that] all parties know the rules of the game 
ahead of time."129  That said, Part IV of this Comment begins by describing the SPOE 
approach as implemented through bankruptcy and then analyzes its application to describe 
how it accomplishes the aforementioned goals.  
A. The Bail-in, Not Bail-out Strategy  
The single most important feature of the SPOE strategy is the source of the 
funding.130  During the 2008 financial crisis, failing SIFI’s were rescued by funds outside 
the institution in the “form of taxpayer assistance via a direct intervention by the sovereign 
government,” hence a bailout.131  Conversely, the SPOE approach allows for funds to 
come from within the institution, particularly in the form of subordinate debt, henceforth a 
bail-in.132 The SPOE strategy is made possible by the structure of large U.S. financial 
institutions.  These institutions have a “top-level holding company whose capital structure 
includes substantial amounts of bonds and other long-term unsecured debt but relatively 
                                                 
127 Grohsgal, supra note 124.  
128 Letter from National Bankruptcy Conference, to Senators Cornyn and Toomey regarding R. 1861–
Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act (Jan. 29, 2014).  
129 See Hardee, supra note 38, at 263; See 156 Cong. Rec. H5223, 5226 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement 
of Rep. Capito).  
130 Jim Fuchs, From Bailouts to Bail-ins: Will the Single Point of Entry Concept End “Too -Big-To-Fail”?,  
CENTRAL BANKER,  Summer 2013, at 5–6.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
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few derivatives and other short term debt.”133  With less short-term debt and derivative 
contracts, holding companies are much less susceptible to a run on their assets.  This is 
because assets at the holding company level, such as bonds, even if sold by their holders, 
do not extract liquidity from the financial institution, making the holding company 
structure a great candidate for the SPOE approach.134  The holding company structure was 
established by large US financial institutions because of restrictions put on a bank’s ability 
to branch across state lines and hurdle other preventative regulations in the banking 
industry.  It is merely a pleasant surprise that these financial structures designed to avoid 
regulation, allow for the implementation of the SPOE strategy.135   With the holding 
company structure in place, resolution involves proceedings only at the parent holding 
company level and allows all operating subsidiaries to remain open for business.136  The 
operating subsidiaries would then be recapitalized with assets from the holding company 
and would continue operation as part of a newly created debt-free bridge holding 
company.137  Furthermore, by only placing the old holding company into resolution 
proceedings and not its subsidiaries, systemic effects are limited because critical 
subsidiaries are kept out of resolution and are provided with liquidity from the new 
holding company.138   More importantly, with the establishment of a new bridge company, 
the old holding companies creditors and shareholders are left behind to bear the losses in 
                                                 
133 See Skeel, supra note 113, at 9.  
134 Lubben, Stephen J., OLA after Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?  (November 11, 2013). 
Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper (No. 2353035) at 2, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353035.  
135 See Skeel, supra note 113, at 2.    
136 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 16 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein); FDIC ADVISORY COMM. ON 
SYSTEMIC RESOLUTION, The Single Point of Entry Resolution Strategy (Dec. 11, 2013), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2013/2013_12_11_presentation_title-ii.pdf. 
137 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 16 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
138 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
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bankruptcy.139   Under the new SPOE approach, bankruptcy now has the tools to: “(1) 
create and transfer the failed holding company’s assets to a bridge financial company; (2) 
impose a temporary stay on financial contract terminations and a temporary override or 
cross-defaults; (3) the ability to assume financial contracts and related guarantees; and (4) 
the availability of temporary secured liquidity.”140   Is there now a workable alternative to 
the OLA and does Subchapter V provide superior protection against another financial 
crisis; have we ended “too-big-to-fail”?  These questions are not yet answered and it 
remains unlikely they become answered until the SPOE strategy is tested in the 
marketplace.  Conversely, what is answered by amending the Bankruptcy Code is that 
there now exists a workable alternative to the OLA and the Bankruptcy Code is capable of 
providing resolution to troubled financial firms or SIFI’s.  The following subparts will 
explore how resolution proceedings are commenced and undergone via the new 
Subchapter V. 
1. Tri-party balancing act, consideration of debtors, creditors and governmental 
aims when commencing Subchapter V proceedings.  
 
Under Subchapter V, proceedings with respect to a “covered financial 
institution”141 can commence either voluntarily by the distressed firm or involuntarily by 
the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”).142  Subchapter V takes a middle ground position by 
                                                 
139 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
140 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 16 n. 2 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
141 “The Dodd-Frank Rule applies to ‘covered companies,’ which is defined to include (i) any U.S. bank 
holding company that has $50 billion or more in consolidated assets, (ii) any fo reign bank or com- pany that 
is a bank holding company, or that is treated as a bank holding company, with $50 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets, and (iii) any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board Implementing Section 
165(d) of the Act )” Memorandum from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meaghar & Flom LLP & Affiliates on the 
Dodd-Frank requirement for covered financial institutions to develop global contingency plans (Sept. 23, 
2011).  
142 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 22 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
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adopting a two-scenario approach to commencing proceedings.143   Subchapter V 
ultimately does not give all the power to the FRB nor leaves it solely in the hands of the 
financial firm when contemplating relief in bankruptcy.  In a conventional bankruptcy 
case, only the debtor (voluntarily) or its creditors (involuntary) are able to commence 
proceedings for the purpose of enforcing their own respective rights and obligations.144  
Contrarily, under Title II, proceedings to be put into OLA receivership are involuntarily 
initiated by the federal government for the main purposes of preventing a financial crisis 
and another taxpayer bailout, as in 2008.145  Subchapter V, as stated above, may 
commence by the debtor or the FRB for purposes of reorganizing the failing firm and 
preventing harm to market stability.146  Therefore, this approach increases the likelihood 
that the aim of creditors (maximizing their return), debtors (reorganizing the distressed 
firm), and the government (preventing market contagion) are achieved when commencing 
proceedings.147  Decisively, this minor but important revision to commencing proceedings 
encourages financial corporations to pursue restructuring options and limits the 
government’s discretionary power to involuntarily invoke proceedings148 by subjecting 
them to the Bankruptcy Court for determination that their decision “shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to prevent imminent substantial harm to 
                                                 
143 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 66 (statement of Steven E. Hessler).   
144 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 66 (statement of Steven E. Hessler).   
145 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 66 (statement of Steven E. Hessler).   
146 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 66 (statement of Steven E. Hessler).  
147 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 66 (statement of Steven E. Hessler). 
148 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 76 (statement of Steven E. Hessler) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 
(2012)) (“Chapter 11 applies the concept of a “debtor in possession retaining the ability to manage its 
business post-petition… this ensures that decision makers of distressed corporations are not disincentivized 
from pursuing the difficult but necessary restructuring decisions that may involve or lead to a Chapter 11 
filing”).  
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financial stability in the United States.”149 The next subpart will address the proposed 
treatment of QFC’s under Subchapter V.  
B. The Automatic Stay as Applied to Qualified Financial Contract s  
As previously stated, the treatment of qualified financial contracts in bankruptcy 
and its application to Lehman Brothers caused chaos and major disruption in the market 
place.150 Consequently, Subchapter V helps to limit some of that disruption by subjecting 
QFC’s to the automatic stay, even if for only forty-eight hours.  First, in order to facilitate 
the transfer of any derivatives and short-term debt to the newly created bridge entity, 
§1188 of the bill permits a stay of forty-eight hours from the commencement of 
proceedings on qualified financial contracts.151  The stay halts a ‘run’ by the institutions 
derivative counterparties long enough to facilitate the transfer to the newly created bridge 
holding company.152  Furthermore, the stay is essential to successfully make the transfer of 
assets to the bridge company.  This is because without the stay there would unlikely be 
any assets left by creditors to transfer to the bridge company.  Additionally, the proposed 
legislation addresses the issue of QFC location.  Most of financial firms QFC’s are in the 
operating subsidiaries of the holding company.  Consequently, one of the most important 
provisions of the bill is bankruptcy’s ability to override cross-defaults in QFC’s pursuant 
to §1188(f).  Cross-default provisions are contracts that have been entered into by the 
debtor’s affiliates or subsidiaries that “make the debtor’s bankruptcy a default under the 
affiliate contract,” hence the ability of the counterparty to now terminate the contract, in 
which they are then capable of making a run at the firms going concern assets essential to 
                                                 
149 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 70 (statement of Steven E. Hessler)(citing § 1183(a)(2)(A)(iv)).  
150 See Skeel, supra note 113, at 14-18.  
151 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421,113th Cong. §1188 (2014); Skeel, supra 113, at 
16.  
152 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 28 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).   
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the operation of vital subsidiaries.153   Section 1188(f) limits these counterparty 
termination rights crucial to the SPOE recapitalization.154  As stated by Donald Bernstein 
before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and Antitrust Law: 
“Overriding cross-defaults in QFCs of affiliates of a covered financial 
corporation is crucial to a single point of entry recapitalization because 
affiliate QFCs are often guaranteed by the holding company and, if the 
holding company files for bankruptcy or loses its credit rating, termination 
rights may be triggered, even though the affiliate counterparty is healthy, 
well capitalized (having been recapitalized) and has not been placed into 
bankruptcy proceedings or receivership. These cross-defaults to the holding 
company’s bankruptcy or downgrades accordingly need to be overridden 
by the statute if the external counterparty’s termination rights are to be 
eliminated.155 
 
Therefore, enabling the automatic stay to incorporate QFC’s and override the safe 
harbor provisions, bankruptcy is able to limit some of the systemic effects caused 
by a run on assets, provide liquidity to the new bridge company, and preserve a 
distressed financial firms books.  
C. International Standard for the Resolution of Global SIFI’s  
The United States and the United Kingdom have heavily interconnected 
markets, and the U.K. possesses the highest counterparty credit exposure of the 
largest U.S. financial firms.156  Therefore, through a cooperative SPOE or bail-in 
strategy for both party’s systemic banks, resolution proceedings for host country 
operations are unnecessary.157  The key to both the U.S. and the U.K. believing in 
the SPOE strategy as their preference “is the fact that recapitalization and bail-in 
strategies allow the firms to continue their business and meet their operating 
                                                 
153 Skeel, supra note 113, at 15.  
154 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 29 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
155 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 29 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
156 See, Memorandum from International Monetary Fund on Cross-Border Bank Resolution, prepared by 
IMF staff to brief the Executive Board on June 9, 2014 (June 2, 2014).  
157 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 19 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
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obligations in the ordinary course in both home and host countries.  As a result, 
local regulators should not feel compelled to take precipitous actions that can 
hinder the resolution of the overall group.”158  Irrefutably, because Subchapter V 
of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014 employs a SPOE strategy, the 
bill brings us closer to solving global disruption of failing systemically important 
financial institutions.  
V.  THE REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE  
Resolution of a SIFI should be done in a manner that maximizes value for 
stakeholders, minimizes systemic disruption and moral hazard, and protects taxpayers 
from loss.159  The proposal of a bail-in strategy through the addition of a Subchapter V to 
the Bankruptcy Code does further these aims.  Unfortunately, issues still exist that need to 
be addressed if the Bankruptcy Code is going to successfully create a uniform regime to 
resolve distressed financial firms.   
A. The Liquidity Shortfall  
The most glaring concern when implementing the SPOE approach through the 
Bankruptcy Code is its failure to address the problem of obtaining “new” capital for 
liquidity purposes.160  Access to liquidity is essential because without it, “regulators and 
the market will lack the confidence needed to preserve at least a minimal sense of calm 
without which all parties—regulators, counterparties and other market participants- will 
race to seize assets and withdraw liquidity at all levels of the SIFI.”161  Therefore, in order 
to accomplish a stabilization of the marketplace and the restructuring of a financial 
                                                 
158 FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 20 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).  
159 2014 Hearing, supra note 25, at 56 (statement of Jane Lee Vris).   
160 See 2014 Hearing, supra note 25, at 57 (statement of Jane Lee Vris, chair of Capital Markets Committee, 
National Bankruptcy Conference, Partner and General Counsel, Millstein & Co., L.P.).  
161 See 2014 Hearing, supra note 25, at 57 (statement of Jane Lee Vris). 
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institution, immediate liquidity is needed.  New liquidity does not consist of the 
transferred assets to the bridge company as explained earlier, but must be obtained from 
another source, such as in the form of DIP loans.  The problem rests with obtaining DIP 
funding during a time of financial distress; this may be difficult and time consuming, 
which is not ideal for the resolution of a SIFI.  Even under the best of circumstances, the 
market will need to divulge the information about the restructuring of the financial firm 
before market participants will begin to extend credit.  More broadly, any delay in time 
waiting for market liquidity to return can be detrimental to the successful restructuring of 
the financial institution.  As argued by bankruptcy scholar Stephen J. Lubben:  
Successful recapitalization is going to depend on the va lue of the 
enterprise. That value will be largely a function of the value of the SIFI’s 
subsidiaries, perhaps with a little premium that reflects the synergies of 
having all those subsidiaries working together under a single roof. If that 
value is no longer sufficient to support the capital the financial institution 
needs, there remains a major problem. Either losses will have to be 
imposed at the subsidiary level to cut down the size or the FDIC will 
simply have to inject value into the institution.162  
 
If the FDIC does provide liquidity to the institution we are left with the question of “is this 
another bailout?”  In short, if the FDIC uses taxpayer funds to prevent the liquidation of a 
financial company, many opponents of reforming the Code will be in uproar.  The truth is 
that some mechanism must be in place to provide for an additional source of backstop 
liquidity to prevent flight of short-term capital and stabilize the institution, particularly if 
there is a risk of contagion.163  After a financial firm is recapitalized through the SPOE 
approach it defeats the entire purpose to not provide sufficient liquidity in the event the 
firm needs it to fend off a liquidity run.164  This is extremely important especially when it 
                                                 
162 See Lubben, supra note 134, at 3.  
163 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
164 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein). 
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comes to SIFIs.  Distressed banks have had access to funding through the discount 
window during times of financial distress in order to prevent or fund a run on their assets 
and diversified financial institutions with broker dealers, insurers, and other operating 
subsidiaries must have access to credit support other than through the public markets to do 
the same.  
 Donald Bernstein, co-chair of the Insolvency and Restructuring Group at Davis 
Polk & Wardwell LLP says, “after three-and-a-half decades of experience working with 
troubled companies, that the simple availability of a committed liquidity source is the best 
way to assure that the liquidity source is not needed.”165  Furthermore, to subvert the too-
big-to-fail and bail-out arguments, the liquidity provided would not be risk capital.166  It 
would be provided to healthy firms on a secured basis in order to protect taxpayers from 
loss.167  With the development of the SPOE mechanism and the safeguards put in place to 
protect taxpayers, now, in this post financial crisis world is the time for bankruptcy law to 
reconcile illiquidity problems caused by creditor-runs.168 If bankruptcy law can 
sufficiently address this glaring problem posed by distress SIFI’s, bankruptcy can 
effectively end too-big-to-fail and simultaneously prevent the market turmoil caused in the 
2008 crisis.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 As evidenced by the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the resolution 
of a SIFI is now possible to facilitate by the Bankruptcy Code.  Furthermore, by 
                                                 
165 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein ). 
166 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein ). 
167 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein ). 
168 David A. Skeel & Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 
1622-24 (2013) (arguing that “many of bankruptcy’s existing rules, including debtor-in-possession 
financing, sales free and clear of liens, and coerced loans, can be seen as liquidity-providing rules that target 
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implementing the SPOE mechanism into bankruptcy, the courts now have a sensible tool 
they can use to resolve a SIFI, while preserving due process.169  The SPOE approach 
coupled with bankruptcy is one of the most important innovations to emerge after the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank Act.  Nevertheless, SPOE as implanted in bankruptcy, still 
possess some concerns about speed and access to liquidity.170  Based on the remaining 
problems, it is likely that the government must still act as a lender of last resort, and it 
remains to be seen whether the market conditions during a crisis allow for an SPOE 
approach to work smoothly.  Therefore, the elimination of the too-big-fail phenomenon is 
unlikely, but it does take a step in the right direction solving the major issues surrounding 
the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
169  Supra note 113, at 18.  
170 FIBA Hearing supra note 37, at 34.  
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
